The 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision and America\u27s Church-State Proposition by Esbeck, Carl H.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
2008
The 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision and
America's Church-State Proposition
Carl H. Esbeck
University of Missouri School of Law, esbeckc@missouri.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision and America's Church-State Proposition, 23 J.L. & Religion 15 (2008)
THE 6 0 TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE EVERSON DECISION
AND AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROPOSITION
Carl H. Esbeck
On February 10, 1947, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township.' For scholars
of the First Amendment, Everson marks the beginning of the Supreme
Court's modem era with respect to church-state relations. It is easy
enough to state the reason for the decision's prominence, for it was in
Everson where the Establishment Clause was first "incorporated"
through the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the actions
of all state and local governments. But just what did it mean to take the
restraints on federal power that comprise the principle of no-
establishment and to make them limits on the governments of the several
states, as well as on the thousands of municipalities, counties, and school
districts that dot the land? In Part II of these remarks, I will focus on
what has occurred downstream of Everson over these event-filled sixty
years. As the reader will see, I am of the belief that Everson's new deal
has resulted in more good than harm for religious freedom. Still the
record is mixed, as it is with most major developments. However,
before going there, in Part I of this extended essay, I look back in time to
recapture just what was in the bundle of restraints that all nine of the
Justices in Everson said they were bringing forward via the Fourteenth
Amendment and making newly binding on the many unsuspecting state
and local officials.
I. THAT BUNDLE OF RESTRAINTS Now APPLICABLE TO STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
America is modem and religious. An overwhelming number of
Americans say they are people of faith, most of them monotheists. And
* R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, University of
Missouri, Columbia, Missouri. This extended essay was first presented at Princeton Theological
Seminary on February 9, 2007, just one day preceding the 60th Anniversary of the decision in
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. Ewing Township. Ewing Township is located just a short distance to the
southwest of Princeton, N.J. I would like to thank the seminary for hosting the occasion and for
the kind welcome and ensuing discussion by those in attendance.
1. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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the United States today is perhaps the most spiritually pluralistic nation
that has ever existed on the face of the earth.2 While the foregoing
observations are not contradictory, they do depict a multi-layered and at
times confusing state of affairs. It has come about, at least in material
part, because certain perspectives on religious freedom, encouraged by
the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures as many Americans understood
them, counseled respect for religiously informed conscience and also
sought to jurisdictionally render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's
and to God the things that are God's.
Given these perspectives, for heuristic purposes religious freedom
is usefully broken down into two relationships: (i) that between
government and religious individuals; and (ii) that between government
and organized religion.3 With respect to the latter relationship, since the
fourth century, Western civilization has been characterized by a pattern
of dual authority shared by state and church.4 While the respective
spheres of jurisdiction of these two centers of authority have always
been contested, and hence the boundary between them has shifted over
the last sixteen-hundred years, the West has been in accord that there are
two competencies and that the domain of each is in some real sense to be
respected by the other.
The Protestant Reformation (beginning with Luther's ninety-five
theses in 1517) shattered Western Christendom and its unity in one
universal church at Rome.5 The Westphalian Peace came in 1648,
ending the Thirty Years' War. In its wake, a unified Catholic
2. Religious pluralism is a fact. From the government's perspective, such pluralism is
neither good nor bad. From the perspective of believers concerned for their liberty, religious
pluralism is not necessarily bad so long as it is authentic. Openly acknowledging religious
particularity in a civil society that lives with these differences amicably, without denying that the
particulars truly matter, constitutes authentic pluralism. On the other hand, pluralism is
undesirable when religious people are expected to hide their religious differences in the public
square so as not to offend others of a different persuasion.
3. By "organized religion" I mean not only churches, synagogues, mosques, and religious
organizations generally, but also identifiable systems of religion or religious observance such as
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hindu, Buddhism, and the like, as well as their subdivisions such as
Presbyterian, Catholic, Reformed Jewish, and Sunni religious communities.
4. See John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman, Introduction, in Church and State in
American History 1, 1-12 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 3d ed., Westview Press
2003).
So there were two. Priest and prince, or church and state, each needed the other, but
both were separate aspects of one society. This separated double authority structure is
what marked off Western Christendom from Eastern Christianity, and it properly locates
the significance of "church and state."
Id. at 3-4.
5. The Great Schism of A.D. 1054 had earlier divided the church into Western Catholicism
and Eastern Orthodoxy.
[Vol. XXIII
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establishment spanned the south of Europe, Lutheran or Reformed
(Calvinist) churches held the north territory, and religious dissenters
were suppressed in all the emerging nation-states. These Westphalian
states had more sharply defined borders and were vested with the
attributes of what is now called sovereignty. The resulting religious
establishments altered the situation from "universal church in a universal
empire" to one of nation-states and state churches. For the two centuries
following the Westphalian settlement, individual religious liberty
evolved first toward toleration and ever broader legalization of
dissenting religions, and then matured into a fuller, more equality-based
respect for religiously informed conscience. This promising
development altered the first of the two relationships, namely that
between government and individual religious adherents.
Except for Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, the English colonies in
America, when they were first settled, adopted for themselves the
various European models of state and church, and over time moderated
them so as to adjust to New World conditions. Then, unlike Western
Europe, Americans took a wholly novel step whereby the state churches
were disestablished one by one. This latter development dramatically
altered the second of the two relationships, namely that between
government and organized religion.
A. Disestablishment in the States
For an extended period during and after the American War of
Independence (1774-1833), the allied efforts of Protestant dissenters and
statesmen of enlightenment-rationalistic sympathies brought about
disestablishment in those states where the Anglican or Congregational
Church still had a hold (nine of the original thirteen states, plus Vermont
and Maine).6 This made for a total of eleven distinct disestablishment
struggles on American soil. These efforts succeeded first in the
Anglican South and only much later in Puritan New England. The allied
leaders behind this push were prominent statesmen and the clergy of
religious nonconformists. The statesmen, while few in number, were
politically well-placed, whereas the Protestant dissenters were rapidly
growing in number and were disturbing previously homogeneous
communities by moving in. Thus the nonconformists brought to the
table the power of a voting bloc. Both parties to this common cause
6. These state-by-state disestablishments are chronicled in my article Dissent and
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L.
Rev. 1385, 1448-1540 [hereinafter Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment].
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were essential to its success. 7
Disestablishment was a state-by-state affair, and it was not a short-
term project-it took nearly sixty years. Even in the New England
states, where one might expect similar paths to disestablishment,
historian William McLoughlin said he "discovered that there was no
uniformity" from state to state. 8 The Congregational Church continued
to receive financial support as late as 1832-33, and to enjoy other legal
advantages. The tax funding of New England churches was assessed
locally by majority rule, with increasing availability of exemptions for
nonconformists who sought them. Supporters of the Puritan Standing
Order denied that they had an "establishment" as such, whereas
dissenters knew it to be a Congregational Church establishment in all
but name, albeit very differently structured from the top-down Church of
England in Great Britain.
In the South, Anglicans sought to hold on by enlarging their
establishment to embrace all Christian denominations. This proved
unsuccessful. The most dramatic showdown came in Virginia where
disestablishment efforts peaked in the months from May 1784 through
January 1786.9
The state-by-state disestablishments in many ways paralleled the
revival that is now known as the Second Great Awakening.10 The
American religious impulse was becoming popularistic, personalistic,
and democratic, and was accompanied by a leveling of society, less
deference to a learned clergy, a push westward, and the elevation of
progress as an important value.1" And, just as this outpouring of
7. Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America 34-35,
38, 42-45, 51-52 (Harper & Row 1963) (calling the coalition the "pietists" and the "rationalists");
William G. McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 1630-1833: The Baptists and the Separation of
Church and State vol. 1, xv (Harv. U. Press 1971) (calling the allied parties the "pietistic" and
"rationalist" approaches).
8. McLoughlin, supra n. 7, at xvii.
9. On the Virginia disestablishment, see Thomas E. Buckley, Church and State in
Revolutionary Virginia 1776-1787, at 38-173 (U. Press Va. 1977); H.J. Eckenrode, Separation of
Church and State in Virginia: A Study in the Development of the Revolution 74-115 (Da Capo
Press 1971) (originally published 1910); William Lee Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the
American Republic 3-75, 96-106 (Alfred A. Knopf 1986).
10. See Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln 265-272, 279-
280, 349-352 (W.W. Norton 2005). "[Revivalists] came to understand how the successful
voluntarist innovations of the revivals had rendered formal state support unnecessary." Id. at 270.
11. See Nathan 0. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity 3-46 (Yale U. Press
1989); Mark A. Noll, America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln 207-208
(Oxford U. Press 2002). Historians Nathan Hatch and John Wigger report that:
The early American republic [was] ... a period of great religious ferment and
originality. The wave of popular religious movements that broke upon America in the
generation after independence decisively changed the center of gravity of American
[Vol. XXIII
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Protestant enthusiasm shaped the new nation,1 2 the American context
equally altered Protestant Christianity, especially Baptists and
Methodists, the largest denominations to emerge.' 3  For many
Protestants faith became more individualistic, and as much a matter of
the heart as correct doctrine.
The First Amendment (1789-91) had no impact on the struggles
over disestablishment in the several states. That it did is a widely
mistaken belief. Indeed, despite the fact that questions of church-state
relations were coming before the U.S. Supreme Court starting early in
its history, the cases were not resolved by reference to the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause but on other legal grounds. 14 The
religion, worked powerfully to Christianize popular culture, splintered American
Christianity beyond recognition, divorced religious leadership from social position, and
above all, proclaimed the moral responsibility of everyone to think and act for
themselves. In this ferment, often referred to as the Second Great Awakening,
Christendom witnessed a period of religious upheaval comparable to nothing since the
Reformation-and an upsurge of private initiative that was totally unprecedented.
The mainspring of the Second Great Awakening was that religion in America became
dominated by the interests and aspirations of ordinary people. In the generation after the
Revolution, American Christianity became a mass enterprise-and not as a predictable
outgrowth of religious conditions in the British colonies. The eighteen hundred
Christian ministers serving in 1775 swelled to nearly forty thousand by 1845. While the
American population expanded tenfold, the number of preachers per capita more than
tripled; the colonial legacy of one minister per fifteen hundred people [became] one per
five hundred. This dramatic mobilization indicates a profound religious upsurge-
religious organizations taking on market form-and resulted in a vastly altered religious
landscape.
Nathan 0. Hatch & John H. Wigger, Introduction, in Methodism and the Shaping of American
Culture 13-14 (Nathan 0. Hatch & John H. Wigger eds., Abingdon Press 2001).
12. Wigger notes:
Older denominations rooted to traditional patterns of hierarchy steadily lost favor
throughout the era. While the Presbyterians and, to a lesser extent, the
Congregationalists and Episcopalians posted modest gains in absolute numbers, their rate
of growth lagged far behind that of the Methodists and Baptists. This was true not only
on the frontier but also throughout the United States. In the south Atlantic region, where
the Methodists were prominent, the Episcopalians' share of church adherents dropped
from 27 percent to 4 percent between 1776 and 1850. In cities such as New York and
Baltimore, the one religious sentiment that working-class men and women in general
seem to have agreed upon was a strong dislike for established, European-style
clericalism. The early Methodist circuit rider James Quinn clearly understood the
uniqueness of the American situation. Following the Revolution, wrote Quinn,
the anti-Christian union between the Church and state had been broken up, tithes
and glebes could no longer be relied upon for Church revenue, and the religious
orders of America were left free to choose their own course, and worship God, with
or without name, in temple, synagogue, church, or meeting-house, standing, sitting,
or kneeling, in silence or with a loud voice, with or without book.
John H. Wigger, Taking Heaven by Storm: Methodism and the Rise of Popular Christianity in
America 9 (Oxford U. Press 1998) (footnote omitted).
13. See Hatch, supra n. 11, at 3-16; Noll, supra n. 11, at 443-445.
14. See Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases:
Windows on Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 7
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reason, in material part, is simple enough: it was widely understood that
the Bill of Rights was not binding on the states. 15 Because it was limited
to restraining only the actions of the national government, the
Establishment Clause was not taken up and applied by the Supreme
Court until 1899, well into the nation's second century. 16 Only two of
the Supreme Court's twentieth-century cases up to the time of its
decision in Everson, relied on the no-establishment text.17 And it was
not until a year after Everson in the case of McCollum v. Board of
Education that the Court found a violation of the Establishment Clause
for the first time." For all the heightened attention it garners today, it
must be said that the Establishment Clause is very much a late bloomer.
B. Voluntaryism
During this country's early national period, state-by-state
disestablishment was the first fruits of America's embrace of
voluntaryism. Voluntaryism is the historical term (and spelling), but the
concept is easily misunderstood today. Voluntaryism does not refer to
religious belief being consensual and thus that there is an absence of
government compulsion or coercion. To be sure, coerced belief is a
violation of conscience and is prohibited as a matter of the free exercise
of religion.19 But that is not voluntaryism. Rather, in America's early
(2001) (reviewing four church-state disputes that reached the High Court in the first half of the
19th Century and were resolved without resort to the First Amendment).
15. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights is not
meant to bind the states). That included, of course, the protection of religious freedom by the First
Amendment; Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845) (holding that
First Amendment does not protect an individual's religious freedom from the actions of state
officials).
16. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding the use of federal funds for
construction at a Catholic-affiliated hospital corporation situated in the District of Columbia).
17. The two additional pre-Everson cases are as follows: The Selective Service Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding exemptions from military draft for clergy, theology
students, and pacifist denominations); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding
disbursement of Indian trust funds, held by the federal government as trustee, to a Catholic
mission operating religious schools for Indian children). In both cases the Court did a mere
summary inquiry into the meaning of no-establishment. Only one other Supreme Court case pre-
dating Everson expressly referenced the Establishment Clause. In Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890), the Court upheld the conviction of a Mormon residing in the Idaho Territory for falsely
taking an oath to the effect that he was not a member of any polygamous organization. The
holding is properly recognized as a case about the Free Exercise Clause. However, in passing the
Court noted that while the Establishment Clause prohibited government enforcement of a religious
tenet, that truism did not imply that the observance of a religious tenet could not be prohibited by
law in the interest of public morals. Id. at 345.
18. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating a public school program permitting local churches to
hold weekly religion classes in classrooms during regular school hours).
19. This understanding ofvoluntaryism is reflected in the modem Supreme Court's cases that
[Vol. XXIII
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national period the term voluntaryism meant (juridically and
theologically) that organized religion, including specific belief or
observance, was to be voluntarily supported, if at all, only by the people,
the churches, and others in the private sector.2° Voluntaryism describes
a government not actively involved in advancing religion or, for that
matter, that is not actively opposing any or all religion. For example, a
mild establishment such as the Church of England in Great Britain today
does not coerce dissenters, and all faiths are tolerated; yet such an
establishment falls well short of the voluntaryist ideal.21
Disestablishment was the first step in fully realizing voluntaryism,
namely the matter of discontinuing taxation for the support of religion.
Disestablishment, and by extension voluntaryism, were about securing
freedom. But it was the sort of freedom that is consequential to the
action of limiting the power delegated to a government. The aim of
disestablishment in the American states was, in the first instance, to do
away with governmental authority over a state-preferred church.
Disestablishment withdrew official control over doctrine, liturgy,
selection of clergy, and financial support. Historian Jack Rakove nicely
characterizes the event in modem terminology as the deregulation of
organized religion. Moreover, it was not thought paradoxical for
people of Christian faith to have worked for disestablishment, which
many did. They believed, and their experience had shown, that an
established church is a captive church, one in which the form of
worship, liturgy, prayer books, clerical appointments, and ecclesiastical
distinguish the Establishment Clause from the Free Exercise Clause on the basis that the no-
establishment principle (unlike free exercise) does not require a showing of coercion of religion-
based conscience or other religious harm. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 221, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
20. Examples of specific religious belief or observance are a theistic oath, worship services,
proselytizing, prayer, devotional Bible reading (as opposed to the use of the Bible as literature or
history), and the teaching of religion (as opposed to teaching about religion).
21. While voluntaryism will bear its own weight as a civil legal principle, the principle did
coincide with those organized religions that believe that religious faith should be subscribed to
and practiced wholly apart from the affirmative support of the government. The formidable
Jesuit, Fr. John Courtney Murray, criticized voluntaryism as a Protestant reading of the
Establishment Clause rather than, as was his view, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
were merely an article of peace among multiple religious denominations. John Courtney Murray,
We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition 58-72 (image Books ed.
1964); see Miller, supra n. 9, at 134-135, 218-221. However, Fr. Murray's role in Vatican II
suggests that he came to see considerable merit in the American church-state proposition and he
successfully worked to have the Roman Catholic Church move closer to the American view. See
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom
331-353 (U. Cal. Press 1998).
22. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution
311-312 (Vintage Books 1997).
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administration are controlled by the state for the state. With
establishment, a counterfeit called civil religion soon springs up, a
confusion of Caesar and God. This conflation, it was thought, inevitably
leads to the misuse of religion by state officials as an instrument to carry
out political objectives.
At the state level-where the slow and difficult work of
disestablishment took place from 1774 to 1833-the vast number of
Americans pushing for it were not doing so out of enlightenment-
rationalism or secularism. Nor were they primarily motivated, in light
of America's diverse Protestant groups and its growing Catholic
immigrant population, to grant religious freedom to all as the price of
obtaining it for their own denomination. Rather, these American
dissenters (e.g., Isaac Backus and John Leland) were religious people
who primarily sought disestablishment for (as they saw it) biblical
reasons. 23  They were allied in this effort with certain well-placed
statesmen, most notably James Madison, Jr.24 Two corrections were
sought. First, disestablishmentarians decried the state church as
interfering with religion, corrupting the role of clergy, using the church
as a tool to carry out state policy, and oppressing dissenters. Specific
religious beliefs and observances "are not within the cognizance" of
civil government, as Madison succinctly stated the matter.25 A state
church was thought to be bad for authentic faith, disestablishment the
opposite.26
Second, disestablishmentarians believed that a state that took sides
in disputes over creedal tenets and specific forms of religious
observance would dangerously risk dividing the body politic.27 They
23. See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra n. 6, at 1432-1448, 1498-1524
(surveying the efforts of Isaac Backus and John Leland).
24. See Noonan, supra n. 21, at 61-91.
25. James Madison, Jr., A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 1 1,
8 (1785), in The Papers of James Madison vol. 8, 299, 301-302 (Robert A. Rutland & William
M.E. Rachal eds., U. Chi. Press 1973).
26. There is no small number of religious Americans today who cling to the belief that active
government support for religion qua religion is good and the removal of the government's support
is bad. In the long term, however, it is the voluntaryistic proposition that active government
support for religion is harmful in multiple ways: to be genuine, religion is the product of
persuasion not state privilege; independent religious organizations are an effective check on the
power of the state, which in turn helps to preserve and expand liberty; government support for
religion often leads to civil religion instead of authentic faith, causing some to have contempt for a
church that has become a lapdog to civil authorities; and active state support for religion can
compromise (even co-opt) the church and silence her prophetic voice. See Carl H. Esbeck, The
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 63-75
(1998) (collecting authorities) [hereinafter Esbeck, Establishment Clause as Structural].
27. At the time of the American founding, republics were still experimental and thought to be
unstable. The founders knew, for example, how sectarian division contributed to the failure of the
[Vol. XXIII
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believed that specifically religious doctrine and doctrinal disputes were
never properly within the state's temporal authority. By placing specific
religious belief and observance outside the jurisdiction of civil
authorities, the alliance sought a more limited republic, one with no
control over doctrine, forms of observance, selection of clergy, tax
support, or internal church administration.
It must be said, however, that the logical implications of
voluntaryism were not implemented in full by the mid-1830s. The close
association of the legal tradition with nondenominational Protestant
observance was too intertwined to sort out quickly. Thus, while tax
assessments for religion were done away with in the laws of these states
that disestablished, non-financial support for religion and the
nondenominational symbols of religion continued, as actual practice
lagged behind the legal principle. Moreover, the failure to fully
implement voluntaryism in the nineteenth century may well have been
due to more than just the difficulty of unentangling general Protestant
observance from the religious symbols and "God talk" of government
and government officials. Some historians believe that evangelical
Christianity was by the mid-nineteenth century transmogrified into a
"religion of the republic," a mild but nonetheless palpable conflating of
Protestantism and American national destiny.28
C. Separation is not Privatization
Today, the continued outworking of voluntaryism is popularly
known as the "separation of church and state." This separation is of the
institutions of government and organized religion; it is not a bar to
government and religious organizations freely communicating and,
within certain safeguards, openly cooperating with an eye to
accomplishing some public good in temporal matters.29 Indeed, in the
English Commonwealth (1649-58). It was believed that for a nation-state to take sides in disputes
over creeds and other specific forms of religious observance was to dangerously risk dividing the
body politic just at the moment when unity was most needed. Hence, for example, religious tests
for public office were bad for civic peace, as were civil courts attempting to resolve disputes over
religious doctrine. See U.S. Const. Art. VI[3] ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as aQualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
679 (1871) (no civil court jurisdiction with respect to disputes over religious doctrine, polity, or
church discipline). But the focus of "divisiveness analysis" must be on the government alone and
its specifically religious behavior. Care must be exercised so that "divisiveness avoidance" does
not slop over and violate the Free Speech Clause or the right to expressive association. See
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640-642 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
28. Mead, supra n. 7, at 134-155; Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: Protestant Hopes
and Historical Realities 82-133 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1984).
29. Separation of church and state (voluntaryism) is not to be confused with the application of
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early American republic religion was widely expected to serve as a
seedbed of civic virtue, from which a people acquired the knowledge to
properly exercise the office of citizen and develop the self-restraint to
prevent liberty from careening into license. The ever quotable Alexis de
Tocqueville, as a result of his travels in the early 1830s, observed such
an America firsthand:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of
society, but it must nevertheless be regarded as the foremost of the
political institutions .... I do not know whether all the Americans
have a sincere faith in their religion; for who can search the human
heart? but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the
maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion is not
peculiar to a class of citizens or to a party, but it belongs to the
whole nation, and to every rank of society.
The Americans combine the notions of Christianity and of
liberty so intimately in their minds, that it is impossible to make
them conceive the one without the other....
Upon my arrival in the United States, the religious aspect of
the country was the first thing that struck my attention; and the
longer I stayed there, the more did I perceive the great political
consequences resulting from this state of things, to which I was
unaccustomed. In France I had almost always seen the spirit of
religion and the spirit of freedom pursuing courses diametrically
opposed to each other; but in America I found they were intimately
united, and that they reigned in common over the same country.
My desire to discover the causes of this phenomenon increased
from day to day. In order to satisfy it, I questioned the members of
all the different sects .... I found that [Catholic clergy] ... mainly
attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in their country, to the
separation of church and state. I do not hesitate to affirm that
during my stay in America, I did not meet a single individual, of
the clergy or of the laity, who was not of the same opinion upon
this point.30
religious doctrine to questions of public morality and the codification of public morality into civil
law. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-320 (1980) (rejecting argument that codifying a
moral position concerning abortion, one shared by some religions, was a violation of the no-
establishment principle).
30. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America vol. 1, 334-335, 337 (Henry Reeve trans.,
4th ed., J. & H.G. Langley 1864) (originally published 1841).
[Vol. X-XlI
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When separation of church and state is taken to mean a socially or
juridically enforced separation of religious values from public affairs
and the formation of civil law (i.e., the privatization of religion), then the
concept has no antecedent in the early American states.
II. EVERSON'S NOVATION OVER THESE SIXTY YEARS
It is all too common to call a U.S. Supreme Court decision a
landmark or watershed opinion, but Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing Township is the genuine article. The case was a novation, the
substitution of a new legal obligation for an old one. Incorporating the
Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Everson
Court made the clause's restraints applicable to state laws and municipal
ordinances and the actions of their many officials. Writing for the
majority, Justice Black associated the denial of the government's power
over religion with the implementation of voluntaryism when he said that
"religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all
religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or
group., 31 The two-fold nature of the restraint is noteworthy: the state is
without power to either help or hinder organized religion.
For the first time in the nation's history, the daily, retail-level
interactions between church and state were now a matter of federal
constitutional law and thereby subject to federal judicial review. In
Everson we had, so to speak, a nationalization of American juridical-
religious culture. Henceforth, there was to be uniformity in church-state
relations from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Canadian border
down to Mexico.
Because Everson instituted the effort to bring the practice of
voluntaryism more closely in line with its principle, there was much
social clearing to be done. If the ideal of voluntaryism was now to be
taken to its logical ends, then a fresh examination of government support
for religion by way of symbols and "God talk" had to be undertaken.
Thus it was not too long before teacher-led prayer in public schools, as
well as devotional Bible reading, fell under the Court's examination.32
These downstream changes brought about by Everson were painful for
many white Protestants who had until then held the mantle of cultural
31. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
32. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221, 223 (holding that public school classroom prayer and
devotional Bible reading violates the Establishment Clause); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (holding that
public school classroom prayer violates the Establishment Clause).
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authority.
With Everson, an Establishment Clause-not originally intended to
oversee municipal and state laws with respect to the prickly matter of
organized religion-now had to be filled with substantive content to do
just that. For that content, the Supreme Court, rightly or wrongly, drew
deeply upon the rationale and principles that had originally given
impetus to disestablishment in the early states. While acknowledging
that "[n]o one locality and no one group throughout the Colonies could
rightly be given entire credit, ''33 the Court gave special emphasis to
Virginia and its disestablishment struggles, which intensified from May
1784 through January 1786.34
The 1960s' adoption of the legal fiction of taxpayer standing in
Flast v. Cohen35 permitted the Court to police the church-state boundary
even in the absence of a complainant suffering "injury in fact" or actual
religious harm. This is unique, for no claim other than one brought
under the Establishment Clause is permitted by plaintiffs asserting
taxpayer standing.36  Referencing the Virginia experience of 1784-86,
the Flast Court said that the "concern of Madison and his [Virginia]
supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be
the victim if government could employ its taxing and spending powers"
to aid religion.37 Flast showed just how determined the post-Everson
Court was to enforce voluntaryism, thereby further closing the gap
between actual practice and the principle. Even now we see the logic of
voluntaryism being pressed with respect to government displays of the
33. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
34. Id. at 11-13 (Black, J., for the Court); id. at 28, 33-41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For
continued reliance on the Virginia experience, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (referencing the passage of the Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom). Additional authorities are collected at Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra n.
6, at 1578-1584.
35. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court in Flast held that even in the absence of actual "injury in
fact," federal courts have standing to hear taxpayer claims brought under the Establishment Clause
where it is alleged that congressional appropriations are being wrongly channeled to religion. Id.
at 105-106. In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. - , 127 S. Ct. 2553
(2007) (plurality opinion), seven Justices said they continue to adhere to the ruling in Flast,
whereas a different majority of five Justices held that they would not extend Flast to discretionary
actions by officials in the executive branch.
36. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 126 S: Ct. 1854, 1864-1865 (2006)
(denying taxpayer standing in claim alleging a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause).
37. 392 U.S. at 103-104. The Virginia experience was then attributed to the Establishment
Clause (written four years later) as constituting a restraint "designed as a specific bulwark against
such potential abuses of governmental power, and that [the) clause . .. operates as a specific
constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power
conferred by Art. I, § 8." Id. at 104. This attribution of the Virginia experience to the
Establishment Clause is dubious history, but the Court in Flast had an objective in mind other than
fidelity to history.
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Ten Commandments 38 and the "under God" language in the Pledge of
Allegiance.39
No claim is made here that this power-negating nature of the
modem Establishment Clause was originally intended by the authors of
the First Amendment text.40 The argument, rather, is that what the
Everson and post-Everson Supreme Court has been doing, in the main,
is to have the clause take on the meaning of voluntaryism. Moreover,
what vindicates the Court's limitations on the government's authority in
matters of organized religion is its parallel in the dual-authority
relationship of state and church that is deeply entrenched in the Western
legal tradition. Standing, as the Supreme Court does, in the flow of
Western civilization, I believe it is no accident that this has occurred.
A. Where Does Everson Leave Matters?
The Free Exercise Clause today is regarded by the Supreme Court
as an individual right, one applicable to federal, state, and local laws.
The right vests in people, including churches and other groups of people
bound together in religious association. Thus, a religious organization
has standing to assert free exercise rights when the entity, or its
membership, suffers religious coercion or other injury. Coercion or
some other religious burden is a necessary element of any successful
free exercise claim.42  Further, the rights-claimant needs to profess a
religion. Non-belief is an exercise of freedom, but it is not an exercise
38. Compare McCreary Co. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that recent depiction of
the Ten Commandments in county building display case violates Establishment Clause), with Van
Orden v..Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (determining that a stone monument on
the grounds of a state capitol building depicting the Ten Commandments that had been in place
for several years did not violate the Establishment Clause).
39. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that non-custodial
father did not have standing to maintain claim that voluntary public school student's recitation of
"under God" in Pledge of Allegiance violates the Establishment Clause).
40. The Everson Court did indulged the wildly improbable assertion that the Virginia
experience of 1784-86 was bootlegged by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson into the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as it was being drafted by the First Congress
meeting in New York City during the period June to September 1789. 330 U.S. at 11-13; id. at
28, 33-41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights entailed a
mostly different cast of participants and an entirely new array of concerns. We have a sketchy but
still informative record of the debate in both the House and Senate of the First Congress over the
drafting and redrafting of the text that eventually became the Establishment Clause. See John
Witte, Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment 80-89 (2d ed., Westview Press
2005). There is no indication that the Virginia experience of a few years before was even
mentioned during these debates or was otherwise a factor. While Madison was in the middle of
things, Jefferson was in Paris serving as our ambassador to France.
41. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra n. 6, at 1387-1394, 1401-1414, 1589.
42. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221, 223; Engel,
370 U.S. at 430.
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of religion. For those who have a religious faith, the Free Exercise
Clause protects belief absolutely. With respect to religious observance,
however, the clause prohibits intentional discrimination by government
against religious practices-and little else.43
By way of contrast, the nature and scope of the modem
Establishment Clause is less clear. That said, however, the law of no-
establishment is far less uncertain than the Supreme Court's many critics
would allow. For example, much can be learn just by starting with the
text of the clause and its origin as a part of the Bill of Rights. It is
fundamental that constitutional restraints check only the government,
not the private sector. Moreover, the Establishment Clause, indeed the
entire Bill of Rights, vested no new power in the national government.
Just the opposite: the purpose of these ten amendments was to deny to
the new central government the ability to assume powers implied from
the 1789 Constitution that might trench on fundamental liberties. 4
Thus, the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause are not a font
of additional power vested in the national government but a negation of
federal power. And now, with Everson, that same negation of power
runs as well against any assumption of state or municipal authority with
respect to religious establishment.
Now consider the text. The Establishment Clause reads, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The power
of Congress to enact a general law about religion is not negated. Rather,
what is negated is a law about, more narrowly, "an establishment" of
religion. So, for example, assume the 1791 Congress had enacted a law
regulating conscription into the Army and Navy. In exercising the
express constitutional power to oversee the armed forces, 45 nothing
prevented Congress from providing an exemption from the draft for
religious pacifists. While the source of power to provide for such an
exemption had to come from a delegated power in the original 1789
43. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Empl.
Div. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). There are limited instances when even intentional
discrimination on the basis of religion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. See Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (long-standing state constitutional provision prohibiting state funding
of those training for the clergy was held sufficient to support exclusion of divinity student from
state scholarship program without violating the Free Exercise Clause).
44. See Richard Labunski, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights 178-255
(Oxford U. Press 2006). James Madison, Jr., a member of the House of Representatives,
introduced the Bill of Rights and said their purpose was "to limit and qualify the powers of the
Government, by excepting out to the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought
not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 1 Annals of Congress 454 (House of
Representatives, June 8, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834).
45. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 14 delegates to Congress the authority "To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
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Constitution (not the Establishment Clause because it is not a font of
power), nothing in the Establishment Clause prohibits such an
exemption. Although adopting a military draft exemption for pacifists is
certainly to "make [a] law respecting" religion, the exemption is not
more narrowly about "an establishment" of religion. As a second
example, it would be fully consistent with the Establishment Clause for
Congress to enact comprehensive legislation under the Interstate
Commerce and Taxing Clauses so as to require employers to provide
unemployment compensation to their employees, but then to exempt
religious organizations from the act.46 To enact such a religion-specific
exemption is certainly to "make [a] law respecting" religion, but the
exemption is not "an establishment" of religion.
In a similar vein, although the text of the Free Exercise Clause
disallows laws "prohibiting" religious exercise, the government retains
authority to allow for those wishing to independently pursue their
religious interests. For example, a public school is free to have a policy
permitting a teacher to observe a religious holy day during one of the
teacher's allotted "personal days." While the school's power to
accommodate the teacher does not come from the Free Exercise Clause,
neither does the clause negate such a power.
The foregoing demonstrates why law professor Philip Kurland's
theory that what is constitutionally required is a "religion blind
government" 41 is deeply flawed, for his theory is contrary to the very
text of the two Religion Clauses. Indeed, the government's
noninvolvement in religious belief and doctrine is enhanced by a
legislature's religion-specific exemptions from general regulatory and
tax burdens.48  Government does not establish religion by leaving it
alone. Rather, such exemptions expand religious freedom and reinforce
the desired church-state separation. Hence, it is entirely proper that the
Supreme Court has held in all congressional religion-exemption cases to
46. See Rojas v. Fitch, 127 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that statutory exemption for
faith-based organizations from unemployment compensation tax did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
47. See Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law: Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court 18, 112 (Aldine Pub. Co. 1962) (proposing that First Amendment means religion can never
be use as a basis for classification by the government).
48. While religious exemptions from general regulatory and tax burdens are compatible with
the Establishment Clause, exemptions that discriminate among religions or that cause government
officials to be drawn into the task of resolving a question of religious doctrine in order to
administer a law do violate the Establishment Clause. See Tex. Mthly., Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1
(1989) (plurality opinion) (disallowing state sales tax exemption on sale of a narrow range of
sacred literature); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (disallowing regulatory law that favored
longstanding religions but not newly emerging faiths).
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come before it that the legislation in question does not violate the
Establishment Clause. 49  The Court's rationale in these cases has not
always been entirely logical, but the Justices have consistently reached
the right result.
B. Nondiscrimination in General Programs of Aid
When the modem Supreme Court turns from religious exemptions
to take up the constitutionality of general programs of government
financial assistance, whether for education, health care, or social
welfare, the Court's recent emphasis has been on nondiscrimination (or,
if one prefers, "equal treatment"). The Court's focus is on the ultimate
beneficiaries and their ability to receive the intended aid without penalty
because of any religious leanings.50  A qualified beneficiary of a
government aid program ought to be free to choose from whom he
receives the intended service, including services delivered by a faith-
based provider. This is the principle that underpins the G.I. Bill and
college student loans, and animates the push for school vouchers,
Charitable Choice, and the Faith-Based Initiative.51 Enabling these
private religious choices further differentiates and enriches American
49. See The Selective Service Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (holding that clergy, theology
students, and religious pacifist could be exempt from military draft consistent with Establishment
Clause); Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that religious pacifist opposed to all war
could be exempt from military draft consistent with Establishment Clause); Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding
that nondiscrimination statute could exempt religious organizations from prohibition on religious
discrimination in employment consistent with Establishment Clause); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709 (2005) (holding that federal civil rights legislation requiring states to accommodate many
religious practices of prison inmates was consistent with the Establishment Clause).
50. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (plurality
opinion); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
These programs have a secular purpose, namely, education, health care, or social welfare services.
Hence, funding the programs is clearly within the government's authority. It remains true, of
course, that government cannot have as a legislative purpose the support of religion qua religion.
An absolute in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the "prohibit[ion against] government-
financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith."
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 611 (quoting Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385
(1985)).
51. See U.S. Dept. of Justice (Carl H. Esbeck), Statement Before the United States House of
Representatives Concerning Charitable Choice, before the Subcommittee on the Constitution,
U.S. House Judiciary Committee (June 17, 2001), reprinted at 16 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics & Pub.
Policy 567 (2002). When the regulations are followed, the Faith-Based Initiative generally, and
Charitable Choice in particular, have been found to be consistent with the Establishment Clause.
See Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
state-funded addict rehabilitation program operated by a faith-based organization); Am. Jewish
Cong. v. Corp. for Natl. & Community Serv., 399 F.3d 351 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding funding of
federal AmeriCorps program operating in conjunction with religious university that was training
teachers for inner-city schools).
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society, and thereby adjusts the administration of welfare programs to
the religious desires of the people. So long as the religious character of
faith-based providers is safeguarded, there is no reason to deny to
qualified beneficiaries free choice with respect to their access to
education, health care, and social service programs.
It is little noted today that in Everson, freedom of choice for the
intended beneficiaries of a general program of aid was upheld. Words
of strict separationism aside, the Everson majority said that it was not
unconstitutional for New Jersey to permit parents of students to be
reimbursed for the out-of-pocket cost of school transportation, including
reimbursing the parents of students attending religious schools. But
Everson was not the first case permitting beneficiary choice, nor the last.
The Native American students in the 1908 case of Quick Bear v. Leupp
voluntarily attended schools on their reservation that, as it happened,
were religious schools; and their parents directed the federal government
as trustee to make trust fund payments to cover the tuition.52 And, of
course, this idea of beneficiary choice is reflected in the Court's modem
cases involving income tax deductions for payments of school tuition,"
provision of special education services,54 and school vouchers.55 So
Everson stands as an early contribution to a now growing line of
beneficiary-choice cases.
C. Religion is Exceptional, but Not Therefore an Object of Disfavor
The foregoing approaches of the Supreme Court to statutory
religious exemption cases and to affirmative aid cases are not
contradictory. Only in a superficial sense are the first line of cases
"separation-based" and the second line of cases "equality-based" such
that they might be seen as inconsistent. Rather, minimizing the
government's influence on each individual's choices in religious matters
is the unifying principle.56 Reducing the government's influence on
people's religious choices on where to receive government benefits
expands their freedom, as do religion-specific exemptions from
52. See 210 U.S. 50, at 81-82 (1908) (upholding disbursement of money by the federal
government of Indian trust funds, held by the government as trustee, to a Catholic mission
operating religious schools for Indian children).
53. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding state tax deduction for parents of
students at religious school for education-related expenses).
54. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that a student that
transferred from public to religious high school did not lose his special education assistance).
55. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (upholding state school voucher plan for urban area).
56. See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 Emory L.
J. 43, 46 (1997).
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regulatory legislation. This unifying principle works to free people to
follow any religious leanings they might hold.
In important respects, religion is unique or exceptional, and
government sometimes has to treat it as such. Indeed, the First
Amendment admits the exceptionality of religion by expressly
safeguarding its free exercise. But exceptionality does not preclude a
rule of nondiscrimination (or "equal treatment") with respect to religion
in the context of a government-provided forum for speech or a
government's general program of aid. One begins with the reality that
the First Amendment is a negative freedom. A "negative freedom"
focuses on what the government cannot do to a person, not what a
person can demand of his or her government. But when the government
elects to affirmatively extend welfare or educational services to a
general class of beneficiaries, then the government should not exclude
an individual from the class because she makes a religious choice over a
secular choice. To take note of religion only in order to exclude it from
modem civil society is not only not required by the Establishment
Clause, but runs counter to the clause's predisposition to enlarge
religious freedom.
Universities and K-12 schools are complex organizations. So are
hospitals. So are nursing homes, homeless shelters, halfway houses,
drug rehabilitation centers, domestic violence shelters, and other faith-
based social service providers. They all need money, and for nearly all
of these sizable, complex organizations the task of meeting their fiscal
needs necessarily entails some public money to supplement their private
resources. The United States has not been a Night Watchman State for
decades; rather, what we have is an affirmative Welfare State that is
deeply involved in the people's well-being, be it in health care,
education, or social services. Private-sector but public-serving
organizations that are entirely privately funded hardly exist except on a
very small scale. In a modem Welfare State-the sort of state where
Americans actually live--discriminatory funding programs are the worst
possible form of government policy. Competition for scarce financial
resources puts pressure on religious citizens and the faith-based
organizations they have created to adapt their own religious choices to
the government's favored behaviors. That pressure turns discriminatory
funding into an engine of secularization, no less damaging to religious
freedom because of the absence of malice.
Genuine separation of church and state means keeping the Welfare
State out of the business of regulating and shaping religious decisions by
those operating faith-based organizations. Restraining the state,
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including its courts, from becoming entangled in determining which
organizations are "secular enough" to be eligible for aid and which are
"too religious" to fund is to reinforce church-state separation. Providing
generally available programs of public assistance, neutral with respect to
the character of the many eligible recipients-be they pervasively
religious, a little religious, or nonreligious-will help to keep Caesar out
of God's business. And that is good for both Caesar's people and for
expanding the people's liberty to make religious choices.
The rule of nondiscrimination with respect to affirmative programs
of aid was first built on cases involving religious speech and equal-
access to a public forum.57 When it comes to the matter of religious
speech and symbols, the threshold question is whether the speech is
private (in which case it is generally protected by the freedom of speech)
or whether the speech is fairly attributable to the government. If the
latter, then no-establishment limits the government's authority to
sponsor or promote any ritual or symbol that carries a specific religious
message.58 Government sponsorship of religious speech would be an
instance of Caesar interfering in the marketplace of specifically religious
ideas, a subject matter not within the cognizance of our limited
republic.59 This is voluntaryism. On the other hand, if the religious
speech is not fairly attributed to the government (and is thus private
speech), then nondiscrimination (equal treatment) is required with
respect to religious speech and secular speech of the same kinds.
D. Everson' s Detractors
There are many detractors among both the left and the right to what
the Supreme Court has done post-Everson. For example, Justice
57. The first in this line of speech equal-access cases is Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (striking down under Free Speech Clause state university restrictions on student religious
groups meeting in university classroom buildings; exclusion not required by the Establishment
Clause). The most recent speech equal-access case is Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch. 533
U.S. 98 (2001) (striking down under Free Speech Clause a K-12 public school's denial of after-
school access to classrooms for religious group seeking to meet with children upon first obtaining
parental permission; exclusion not required by Establishment Clause). A case involving equal
access to a speech forum and thereby access to government financial aid that partly defines the
forum is Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofU. Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
58. The Free Speech Clause does not, of course, protect speech attributable to the
government. The government has constitutional powers and duties, but no constitutional rights.
Rights are to protect people from the government, not the other way around.
59. Depending on the facts, it can be a close call whether the speech in question is private or
governmental. An example of the private versus government question being difficult is student-
initiated prayer at the opening of a public high school football game. In Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, a divided Court attributed the student's prayer to the government. 530 U.S. 290, 315-317
(2000). That seems rightly decided.
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Clarence Thomas has created a stir by renewing interest in the
"federalism theory" of the Establishment Clause.60 The "federalism
theory" is that the Establishment Clause was originally meant to leave
matters involving religion and government in the hands of the states, and
thus the clause does not apply to limit state or local law. In evaluating
Justice Thomas' line of argumentation, however, it is important to
remember that, as reported out by the First Congress in September of
1789 for ratification by the states, the Establishment Clause denied
power to the new national government in not just one respect but two.
For clarity, I will call these the vertical denial and the horizontal denial
of federal power. Confusion has come about because some have
seemingly realized only the vertical denial, or what is called the
"federalism theory." When the vertical denial is thought to also negate
federal power with respect to laws about "an establishment" in the
District of Columbia and federal territories, then it is better termed the
"jurisdictional theory."
By its terms, one of the objects of the Establishment Clause was to
act as a vertical denial preventing the national government from
interfering with the governments of the states and the ways in which
each state dealt with the matter of religion. 61  The purpose of this
disavowal of power was to protect the residual sovereignty of the states
from the newly formed central government. This residual sovereignty
was important but narrow, confined to laws about "an establishment" of
religion. Nevertheless, the denial meant, for example, that Congress had
no power to disturb the Congregational establishments in New England.
It also meant, for that matter, no congressional power to overturn laws
auxiliary to an establishment, such as state religious oath and test
clauses, state-approved liturgy and prayer books, the licensure of clergy
to preach and marry, and the approval of meeting houses for worship.
Scholars delight in pointing out this purpose of the Establishment
Clause, for it is an embarrassment to the Supreme Court, which
completely overlooked this feature when deciding Everson. The no-
establishment principle was said by the Everson Court to be binding on
state and local governments pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a complete inversion of the vertical denial of
power that is the Establishment Clause.62  Those who tout the
60. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 727-728 (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove United Sch. Dist., 542
U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. See Esbeck, Establishment Clause as Structural, supra n. 26, at 15-17 (collecting
authorities).
62. Recognizing only the vertical denial, law professor Kurt Lash proposed a means whereby
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"federalism theory" (or "jurisdictional theory") have a powerful
criticism of Everson. However, some of these critics themselves
overlook a second aspect to the Establishment Clause.
The text of the Establishment Clause also worked a horizontal
denial, one that writers often miss or at least prefer to minimize. Justice
Thomas, for example, gives it no mention. The horizontal work of the
clause is to act as a negation of federal power when the national
government is dealing with expressly delegated federal matters.63 For
example, when Congress first provided for an Army and a Navy, it
might have asked, with an eye to the Establishment Clause, what (if
anything) it could do concerning facilities for soldiers and sailors to
worship, or for the provision of military chaplains? Or, in drafting the
judiciary act that created the lower federal courts, Congress might have
asked, with an eye to the Establishment Clause, whether the rules of
evidence could permit testimony only upon taking an oath that
acknowledges belief in a Supreme Being. Additional questions that an
early Congress may have faced are: Might the Postmaster General
suspend operations for postal delivery on Sundays? In passing a
copyright law, may original works with religious themes be protected as
the vertical denial or "federalism theory," meant to protect the states from the national
government, can nevertheless be understood today as an individual right to religious liberty, and
thus fairly incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment. Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of
the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1085
(1995) (arguing that how the American people thought about the Establishment Clause changed
between 1791 and 1868, and that it is the thinking of 1868 that is relevant when incorporating the
clause and applying it to the states). However, the evidence that the meaning of the Establishment
Clause changed during this period is thin and not altogether convincing, as is the evidence that the
Reconstruction Congress gave much thought to the current meaning of the Establishment Clause.
See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 436 n. 112 (Harv. U. Press 2002)
(discussing why it is unlikely that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to alter the meaning of
the Establishment Clause); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction
253, 385 n. 91 (Yale U. Press 1998) (historical evidence sparse and members of reconstruction
Congress did not list non-establishment among their catalogue of rights); Jonathan P. Brose, In
Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate the
Establishment Clause, 24 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 17-29 (1998) (reviewing the congressional history
of the post-Civil War debate over drafting the Fourteenth Amendment and certain religion
questions, and concluding that in 1867 and 1868, the Establishment Clause continued to be
viewed as a power-limiting clause rather than as a rights-based clause).
63. Ralph Ketcham, Framed for Posterity: The Enduring Philosophy of the Constitution 103
(U. Press Kan. 1993); Bernard H. Siegan, The Supreme Court's Constitution: An Inquiry into
Judicial Review and Its Impact on Society 114 (Transaction Books 1987); Esbeck, Establishment
Clause as Structural, supra n. 26, at 15-22, 26-27 (citing additional authorities). For example, the
1789 Constitution gave Congress express power to legislate with respect to the admission of new
states into the union. And in doing so, such legislation could touch on the matter of religion, so
long as the law did not create "an establishment." Indeed, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which the First Congress reenacted, did touched on the matter of religion in Articles I and 3, but
did so in a manner that was not "an establishment." See An Act to Provide for the Government of
the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
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a matter of intellectual property? Can a church file for bankruptcy?
Many of those who warm to the "federalism theory" (or
"jurisdictional theory") assume that the vertical denial of federal power
with respect to religion is fairly broad, seemingly having left the states
to do as they will with the entire field of religion and law. But when the
horizontal denial of federal power is acknowledged at all, these critics
write as if the scope of denial is narrow--often merely preventing the
federal government from establishing a national church. However, the
breadth of the vertical denial and horizontal denial must be identical
because they are governed by the same words, the key being the
meaning of "an establishment."
As noted earlier, the clause's terms deny to Congress only the
power to make a law with respect to "an establishment" of religion, thus
leaving it free to legislate more generally with respect to religion. It
follows, for example, that Congress had the authority, without running
afoul of the clause, to exempt religious pacifists from military service
and thereby allow Quakers and others to exercise their religion. 4 And
Congress had the authority to permit the copyrighting of religious books
and music. These would have been laws that were, inter alia, about
religion, but the laws would not have amounted to "an establishment" of
religion.65
64. The Court sanctioned such an exemption in The Selective Service Draft Law Cases, 245
U.S. 366 (holding, inter alia, that exemption from military draft of pacifists sects was
constitutional), and again in Gillette, 401 U.S. 437 (holding that Congress may exempt a person
from military service if he opposes all war but not those persons who object to participation in a
particular war).
65. In a helpful recent article, law professor Steven Smith critiques others and further
explains his own position with respect to the "jurisdictional theory." See Steven D. Smith, The
Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1843 (2006)
[hereinafter Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause]. Smith's earlier arguments for the
"jurisdictional theory" had come in for criticism. See Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure:
The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 45-48 (Oxford U. Press 1995)
(concluding that the historical search for a substantive rule or principle underlying the Religion
Clauses is doomed to fail because the clauses were intended to be no more than a jurisdictional
allotment of power to the states; hence the provocative title suggesting that the many scholars who
have searched for a substantive rule or standard to guide the courts when applying the
Establishment Clause were foreordained to fail). In his most recent contribution, Smith: (1)
acknowledges the horizontal denial (not just the vertical) that the Establishment Clause worked on
federal power; and (2) notes that jurisdictional allocations necessarily have substantive
consequences. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause, supra n. 65, at 1861, 1874-1880.
From the outset this meant, as Smith seems to acknowledge, that at the horizontal level Congress
had no power (or "jurisdiction") with respect to making laws about "an establishment," but that
Congress could draw on one of its original enumerated powers with respect to making laws more
generally about religion. For example, using its expressed power to regulate the armed forces
Congress could provide for military conscription, but then could also exempt religious pacifists.
Such a law is within Congress' power (or "jurisdiction") whereas the exemption, while about
religion, is not "an establishment" of religion. Smith's reappraisal gets it right, it seems to me, but
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So what is "an establishment"? At a minimum, in regard to this
horizontal denial, the Establishment Clause meant that the new central
government could not establish a national church. It likely meant more
than this minimalist reading. Even in 1791, the horizontal restraint of
the clause would have prevented Congress from providing for an
exemption from the military draft for Protestant pacifists but not Jews,
or for permitting the copyrighting of Protestant sacred texts but not those
of Catholics. Such favoritism of one religion over another not only
burdens an individual's exercise of religion, but also tends to favor and
thus establish one religion over another. That would have been
understood in 1791, much as it is apparent to us today. Moreover, if
Congress had used the Taxing Clause to enact a nationwide version of
Patrick Henry's general assessment bill for the support of clergy,66
surely that too would have violated the Establishment Clause as
understood in 1791. Congressional passage of Henry's bill would not
have established a national church, but it would have been a law
regarding "an establishment" of religion.
In the hands of the Supreme Court, however, the horizontal denial
on the use of national power with respect to expressly enumerated
federal subject matters came to mean much more-and this happened
well before the Everson decision. Consider Quick Bear v. Leupp (1908),
which involved federal trust fund payments to religious schools
enrolling children of Native American parents who chose the schools,
67
and Bradfield v. Roberts (1899), which involved an appropriation of
federal funds to pay the construction costs of a Catholic-affiliated
hospital in the District of Columbia.68 In both cases, the complainants
drains his original 1995 argument of much of its force. We see that Congress in 1791 and going
forward has to work out a definable line between when it has jurisdiction to legislate about
religion and when it does not have jurisdiction to legislate about religion because the desired act is
"an establishment." Call it jurisdictional or call it a substantive rule, is not this line-drawing the
working out of a theory of church-state relations? As such, the Establishment Clause is about the
separation of church and state or, more to the point, the clause is about properly ordering relations
between church and state. Each has its own center of cognizance. Whether one calls it a
"jurisdictional" or a "structural" Establishment Clause, they are one and the same. See generally
Esbeck, Establishment Clause as Structural, supra n. 26. Moreover, this development ought to
come as little surprise because the dual-authority pattern of divided jurisdiction between
government and church has been part of the Western legal tradition since the fourth century. See
Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, 2004 BYU L. Rev., supra n. 6, at 1391-1392 1401-1432.
66. See Patrick Henry, A Bill Establishing A Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion
(Dec. 24, 1784) in Thomas E. Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia 1776-1787, at
188-189 (U. Press Va. 1977).
67. 210 U.S. at 81-82. The Court said "we cannot concede the proposition that Indians
cannot be allowed to use their own money to educate their children in the schools of their own
choice because the Government is necessarily undenominational." Id. at 81.
68. 175 U.S. at 292.
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argued that the Establishment Clause was violated by providing tax
funds to programs operated by a religious organization. In reply, the
United States Attorney made no attempt to defend the case by arguing
that the prohibition of the Establishment Clause was merely to stop the
national government from establishing a national church. Rather, the
litigants on both sides, and the Supreme Court as well, simply presumed
a broader meaning of no-establishment: that the national government
could not directly finance specifically religious ("sectarian") activity.
These cases were won by the federal government on the basis that the
clause did not extend to these particular objects of financial support-
the construction of a hospital available for the treatment of the local
poor, and the payment of funds held by the government for the benefit of
Native Americans and directed by Native American parents to the
school of choice for their children's education.
Other detractors of Everson's incorporation of voluntaryism
believe that the Religion Clauses are in inevitable tension: free exercise
is protective of religion and no-establishment holds religion in check.69
This manner of framing the First Amendment presumes that the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause run in opposing
directions, and indeed will often conflict. If this were so, it then would
become the judicial task to determine if the law in question falls safely
in the narrows where there is space for legislative action neither
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.
This conceptual framework holding that the free-exercise and no-
establishment texts are in frequent tension, and at times are in outright
war with one another, is quite impossible. Each clause in the first eight
amendments to the Bill of Rights (the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
being rules of construction) was designed to anticipate and negate the
assumption of certain implied powers by the national government-a
government already understood to be one of limited, enumerated
powers. Thus, for example, the Free Speech Clause further limited
69. A typical example is as follows:
There can be a natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a
command not to inhibit its practice. This tension between the clauses often leaves the
Court with having to choose between competing values in religion cases. The general
guide here is the concept of neutrality. The opposing values require that the government
act to achieve only secular goals and that it achieve them in a religiously neutral manner.
Unfortunately, situations arise where the government may have no choice but to
incidentally help or hinder religious groups or practices.
John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law 764-765 (3d ed.,
Thomson West 2007).
[Vol. XXIII
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national power and the Free Press Clause did so as well. These two
negatives on power-speech and press-can overlap and thus reinforce
one another but they cannot conflict. Simply put, it is logically
impossible for two negations of a government's net delegated power to
conflict. Similarly, the free exercise provision further restricted the
nation's delegated powers and no-establishment did likewise. These two
negatives can overlap and thereby doubly deny the field of permissible
governmental action, but they cannot conflict. To be sure, each Religion
Clause in its own way works to protect religious freedom. And when
circumstances are such that the scope of the clauses overlap, they
necessarily complement rather than conflict with each other. However,
imagining these two negations of governmental power as frequently
clashing and having to be "balanced" and thus reconciled is deeply at
odds with the fundamental nature of the federal Bill of Rights and the
reason that the public demanded its addition to the 1789 Constitution.7 °
Still other detractors of the post-Everson Court argue that there is
but one Religion Clause, with no-establishment being instrumental to
the free exercise of religion. 7' That there is but one clause is
grammatically correct. That is, up to the first semicolon in the First
Amendment there is one clause with two participial phrases ("respecting
an establishment" and "prohibiting the free exercise") modifying the
object ("no law") of the verb ("shall make"). But it is incorrect to argue,
as these commentators do, that the first participial phrase is instrumental
to the second participial phrase. Rather, each phrase is grammatically
equal to and operates independent of the other. Their equal status is
evident because either participial phrase can be removed and the
sentence still makes sense.
Of course the aim of the one-Religion-Clause argument is not to
correct the Court's grammar, but to keep no-establishment and free-
exercise from conflicting and thus working at cross-purposes. That
objective is right-minded. It is the solution that is wrong. There is a far
more plausible, historically grounded, and grammatically correct way of
keeping the two participial phrases from conflicting while giving each
phrase essential, independent work to do in the service of religious
freedom. The clauses-in-conflict problem can be solved by a rights-
70. See Carl H. Esbeck, "Play in the Joints between the Religion Clauses'" and other
Supreme Court Catachreses, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1331 (2006) (providing an expansion of this
argument).
71. See e.g. Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 620, 627-629 (1992); John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise?, 42 DePaul L. Rev.
567, 567 (1992).
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based free exercise principle that protects the cause of conscience and a
structural no-establishment clause that recognizes the negation of power
in the government with an eye to ordering church-state relations.72
Voluntaryism is about negating the power of government, and it was to
the voluntaryism as played out state-by-state during America's early
nationhood that Everson adopted to give substantive meaning to the
Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
What, then, is America's church-state proposition ushered in by
Everson and its progeny? While many Americans robustly debate
religious beliefs and doctrine, it is the promise that our government will
not throw its weight behind one side or the other of these debates. We
have a free and unregulated market, so to speak, in religious ideas,
practices, and expression. The government is barred from active
involvement---either helping or hindering organized religion-in that
marketplace. The government, rather, is to maintain a form of
"neutrality." Neutrality in this sense does not mean that government
promotes the secular, for secularism is not neutral. Nor is governmental
indifference to religion a position of neutrality, for Americans are a
religious people and the government need not shut its eyes to what is
there for all to see.
There is, one must suppose, no governmental "neutrality" in an
absolute sense. But that is not required. Just as the very text of the First
Amendment is pro-freedom of speech and pro-freedom of the press, in
like manner the First Amendment is pro-freedom of religion. That is
different, of course, from the government being pro-religion. Rather, the
First Amendment is pro-freedom of religion, hardly a startling
proposition for a liberal democracy populated by many religions and
many religious people.
72. See Carl H. Esbeck, Differentiating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 42 J.
Church & St. 311, 323-325 (2000) (explaining in greater detail that the clauses-in-conflict
problem is avoided by a rights-based Free Exercise Clause and a structural Establishment Clause,
each in its own way protecting religious freedom). Further, the courts, commentators, and indeed,
nearly everyone, presently speak and write in terms of two Religion Clauses. That convention
will be virtually impossible to change. Finally, given the sharp cut-back in free exercise
protection as a result of the decisions in Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (limiting protection of Free Exercise
Clause to intentional discrimination against religion) and Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (long-standing state
constitutional provision prohibiting state funding of those training for the clergy was held
sufficient to support exclusion of divinity student from state scholarship program without
violating the Free Exercise Clause), it is a foolish tactic to argue that the freedom of the church
rests primarily on the free exercise text.
[Vol. XXIII
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In this sense, "neutrality" after Everson means that government,
one predisposed to enlarge freedom, including religious freedom, should
work to minimize its influence over the people's religious choices. For
many Americans, their faith-and not just their individual faith but their
understanding of the nature of the church (or other house of worship)
and their membership therein-is an essential part of defining their place
in the world and how they practice their religion with others of like
mind. Nearly always religion has a large communal component. The
organized religious group is where much of the life of faith is
meaningfully lived out. The central value of the First Amendment is,
then, freedom in two senses-not only in the cause of conscience in
spiritual matters, but also, as suggested by the two-fold good that comes
from separating state from church, the necessity of having the
government step back so as to let the church be the church.
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